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Abstract The pixel and the technique of pixelating faces belong to a politics of fear and a digital 
aesthetics of truth which shapes public perceptions of criminality and the threat of otherness. 
This article will draw on Paul Virilio’s account of the pixel in Lost Dimension in order to analyze 
its specific role and operation in relation to contemporary representations of incarceration. In 
particular, the article will consider the figure of the incarcerated informant. The incarcerated 
criminal or informant plays a complex role as both subversive other and purveyor of truth and 
as such constitutes an important example of the ways in which pixelation functions as a visible 
signifier of a dangerous truth whilst blurring, erasing and, ultimately, dehumanizing those 
“speaking” this truth. Our discussion forms part of a larger analysis of the production, framing 
and circulation of images of otherness, identifying Virilio as key to debates around the violence of 
the screen. 
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Introduction: All the Meat is Screaming 
In Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, Gilles Deleuze (2005) describes Bacon’s 
portraits, including the Sweeney Agonistes Triptych, as follows: 
 
The body is a Figure, not structure. Conversely, the Figure being a body, is not a face and does 
not even have a face. It has a head, because the head is an integral part of the body. It can even 
be reduced to its head. As a portraitist, Francis Bacon is a painter of heads and not of faces. 
There is a big difference between the two. For the face is a structured spatial organization 
which covers the head, while the head is an adjunct of the body, even though it is its top. It is 
not that it lacks a spirit, but it is a spirit which is body, corporeal and vital breath, an animal 
spirit; it is the animal spirit of man: a pig-spirit, a buffalo-spirit, a dog-spirit, a bat-spirit [...]. 
This means that Bacon is pursuing a very special project as a portraitist: unmaking the face, 
rediscovering or pulling up the head beneath the face (15). 
 
Rediscovering the head beneath the face is key to understanding the zone of 
indiscernibility between that which defines the human and that which renders the 
figure of the human animal, meat, flesh. However, Deleuze does not consider this 
“unmaking” of the face as a loss. The becoming animal at work in Bacon’s painting 
does not constitute a reduction of the human to some form of primordial being, that of 
the animal. Instead, it constitutes the movement towards something else. Here we 
need to keep in mind that this something else, this becoming flesh, becoming animal 
 is no less violent, no less abject or abhorrent. If Deleuze sees an intimacy in Bacon’s 
work, it is an intimacy that refuses established points of contact - eyes, mouth, nose - 
and, in this respect, such intimacy forces us to confront and contest the points of 
reference and recognition which function as the starting point for all encounters with 
the other.  
This “unmaking of the face” offers a way into thinking about other faces and 
their unmaking. A face of specific and constrained interest is that of the criminal 
rendered anonymous human animal via processes of pixelation. Not simply animal, 
meat, flesh, but a caged animal, squared meat, pixelated flesh. Today’s mass media is 
saturated with images of criminality, from mugshots and e-fits to selfies taken by 
inmates using smuggled mobile phones.1 The role of such imagery and its widespread 
diffusion might seem obvious both in terms of the politics and administration of fear 
it promotes and the age of self-surveillance it embodies (Massumi 1993; Virilio 
2012). Nevertheless, to assume the function of this imagery as already given risks also 
accepting the discourses underpinning functionality and the forms of oppression 
engendered and internalized as a consequence. This article makes a case for Paul 
Virilio’s particular critique of the relationship between aesthetics, politics and 
violence for thinking the implications of contemporary representations of criminality. 
As a key yet underacknowledged element of Virilio’s critique, the pixel will 
constitute the central focus of our discussion via consideration of its function in 
relation to images of the incarcerated informant.  
 
Acts of Framing 
The pixel is not simply complicit but active in the construction of otherness and the 
dehumanization of such otherness. Various scholars have written and spoken at length 
 about the way in which otherness, the threatening, subversive figure of the other [as 
criminal, terrorist but also immigrant, Muslim, homosexual, woman], continue to be 
produced, performed, edited and framed by photographic and cinematic techniques 
and circulated by ever faster, further-reaching modes of diffusion and distribution. 
Following up on questions posed in Precarious Life regarding which lives are 
presented as more or less grievable than others, Judith Butler’s (2010) Frames of War 
draws on both Susan Sontag’s (2003) analysis of our reaction (and lack thereof) 
towards images of disaster and atrocity,  and Jacques Derrida’s (1987) critique of 
framing processes. Butler examines the complex temporal and spatial parameters of 
the photograph and the acts of both taking and viewing photographic images. In 
taking a photograph, the photographer is both outside and inside the events he or she 
is documenting. To what extent, therefore, does photography attest to a complicity 
with or, at the very least, a lack of challenge to the context, the socio-political 
framework which demands and permits such documentation? How is this complicity 
then transferred from photographer to spectator via the circulation and consumption 
of such images? 
W.J.T. Mitchell’s (2010) focus on post-911 forms of representation in Cloning 
Terror looks at George W. Bush’s “War on Terror” as a war waged via images. The 
rhetoric of terror was sustained visually rather than linguistically through media 
saturation of images intended to promote fear amongst the U.S. population. Leaked 
images of U.S. led torture and abuse of Iraqi prisoners and terror suspects contributed 
to rather than challenged the function of such images. Such images, we might argue, 
feed our desire for the abject and the horrific, that which Jean Baudrillard (2005) has 
referred to as “war pornography.” The “hooded man” who acts as the anti-hero of 
Mitchell’s analysis is worth noting as part of the same lexicon as the pixelated 
 criminals who are the less sensational, but more abundantly proliferating, and 
overlooked, examples of this contemporary framing.  
Virilio’s work can be situated over against recent critical engagements on the 
image and the violence it captures, frames and reproduces. His vehement insistence 
on the relationship between technology and aesthetics, perception and truth provide 
two very specific and highly useful perspectives for thinking about processes of 
framing and diffusing images of the criminal “other.” The first is the link he 
establishes between war and cinema. (Virilio 1989; 2005) This is a link which is 
historical, technological and economic in its scope and requires setting out in order to 
better grasp the role played by the pixel within Virilio’s wider reading of 
contemporary media. 
Virilio’s (1989) founding claim in War and Cinema is that war is as much 
about perception and its distortion as it is about destruction. Thus, for Virilio, a 
history of warfare constitutes, first and foremost, “the history of radically changing 
fields of perception.”2 Technological advances to warfare have, in this respect, always 
been as much about enhancing perception, improving surveillance and resisting 
enemy detection, as they have about weaponry. Here, I would like to think more 
specifically about the notions of “captivating” and “capture”, the need to distort the 
perception of the enemy, to confuse and disorient the prisoner of war as much as to 
destroy him (or her), and the role of technology in achieving these dual objectives. 
There are implicit resonances with another form of “capturing” otherness, the 
production and framing of madness, hysteria and criminality via newly developed 
photographic methods during the mid to late nineteenth century (Foucault 2008; Didi-
Huberman 2004). The photographic documentation of female hysteria established and 
promoted by Jean-Martin Charcot in La Salpêtrière and the technique for producing 
 criminal mugshots invented by Alphonse Bertillon both belong to this process of 
“captivation” and “capture.” The problematic other is not simply fixed, framed within 
the space of a photographic image but is required to acquiesce to this process, to 
perform their criminality or madness and henceforth recognize themselves in the 
“accusing image.” (Didi-Huberman 2004) 
Thus, where Didi-Huberman’s (2004) account of this “invention” forces us to 
recognize the “catalogue of horrors” and the combination of “servitude” and “abuse” 
[sévices] embodied in the “service de photographie” at La Salpêtrière, Virilio 
identifies the need to think violence on screen alongside the violence of the screen. 
The screen is more than an empty container, blank surface or two-dimensional frame 
here. It does not just project images but filters them. It does not simply provide a 
frame but is itself implicated in the act of framing. All framing excludes as well as 
includes. The screen does not simply transmit scenes from the battlefield, It is the 
battlefield. 
The second perspective from Virilio (1989), which is inextricably bound to the 
first, involves the specific focus on aesthetics running as a thread throughout his work 
on technology. This extends beyond the production of new representations of space 
such as the aerial view or thermal imaging and the interpretation of such images 
within a military context. Cinematic techniques developed as part of military 
reconnaissance were paramount in producing a new aesthetics subsequently adopted 
by surrealist and avant-garde filmmakers in interwar and post-war Europe.  
But, there is a further dimension at work here. The images and imagery 
encountered on a daily basis during a time of war, in the press, on billboards and so 
on, play a crucial role in shaping public perception, assuring complicity and 
alleviating anxiety. In this way, the striptease and wartime pinups which diverted and 
 contained the sexual frustration of soldiers during WWI and WWII embody a moment 
in the history of war and perception in which images existed to reassure and placate 
all those involved in the war effort via diversion and concealment. Likewise, Virilio 
(1989) describes the heavy investment in cinema production by the Nazi regime as 
recognition of the public’s need for visual stimulus beyond newsreels and 
straightforward propaganda. Today war has become its own pornography, sexual 
imagery no longer operates alongside images of violence. The two poles defining 
human existence, sex and death, have been collapsed and congealed in the images of 
naked Iraqi prisoners being dragged around Abu Ghraib on leashes by female U.S. 
soldiers. In a world of “total war”, there is no need to alleviate anxiety but, rather, to 
ensure its perpetual presence via an aesthetics of fear and alienation. “Total war takes 
us from military secrecy (the second-hand, recorded truth of the battlefield) to the 
overexposure of live broadcast.” (Virilio 1989). All cinema is propaganda henceforth.  
If the role of frame and screen in producing and diffusing the spectacles of 
war and criminality are well documented, I now wish to explore Virilio’s perspectives 
on technology and aesthetics further via some reflections on the “pixel” and, more 
specifically, processes of pixelation. Such processes form part of the “squared 
horizon” Virilio (2005) defines in Desert Screen and are themselves fully implicated 
in the two-fold drive to “captivate” and “capture” which in late capitalism targets 
everyone as potential enemy. The “digital optics” for which the pixel is the basic unit, 
are thus defined by Virilio as a form of “intoxication” which blurs our perception and 
causes us to descend into a form of “voluntary blindness” (Virilio, 1994). 
Having argued for the links between Virilio’s reference to “captivation” and 
“capture” in War and Cinema and the techniques applied to the framing of madness 
and criminality, it becomes imperative to both refine and extend the parameters of his 
 horizon. This then may more fully incorporate this domestic “other.” Virilio’s concept 
of “total war” is important here. We should understand it not simply to mean the 
perpetuity of overseas military intervention and the notion of a war industry 
encompassing all forms of industry – manufacturing, infrastructure, financial trading, 
PR and consultancy etc – but also consider its meaning in terms of the official, 
authorized forms of violence carried out within a domestic space both by the police 
and other law enforcement agents and, equally, through education and media 
representation, the “ideological state apparatuses” identified by Althusser (1971). 
Reagan’s “War on Drugs” was not simply political rhetoric but a real declaration of 
violence against a specific demographic, namely the black community, an attack 
tantamount to a reversal of the ground gained (another reference to war) during the 
civil rights movements of the 1960s (Alexander 2010). The same interplay of 
distance-proximity that is found in the diffusion of images of war waged elsewhere, 
occurs in the representation and circulation of images of the domestic criminal, 
particularly within the context of drug-related crime.3 Likewise, the same 
exclusionary tactics via the doubling of silence and saturation that pertain to war 
reporting are at work in the prison documentaries that dominate prime time television 
in the U.S. and Europe. 
 
What is a Pixel? 
My reading of the pixel is primarily indebted to Virilio’s (1991) references to the 
pixel in Lost Dimension. As “micro-element” of the image, Virilio identifies the pixel 
in terms of a point without dimension. In this respect, the pixel is implicated in the 
flattening of the image both literally and symbolically. At the same time, the pixel as 
the smallest square unit of space on a digital image can be zoomed in or out of as 
 required. Hence, the pixel does not simply flatten the image but does away with 
human experiences of space. Such flattening occurs at both micro and macro levels as 
it encompasses points too small for the human eye to see and vistas too large to be 
contained within our field of vision. To cite Virilio here: 
 
Whether the pixel corresponds to the luminous point of the synthetic image of the computer-
enhanced conception, or whether, in the multispectral scanning of the spy satellite, it represents a 
half-hectare of land, it demonstrates the same indifference, to the landscape, as actual, or as the 
simulated stretch of represented surfaces (Virilio 1991: 34). 
 
For Virilio, the pixel represents the homogenizing of all representation in the service 
of the digital and, more precisely, the instantaneous transmission of data. It is the 
speed by which data is presented and represented which has come to take precedence 
over its selection and analysis. However, the pixel as employed or deployed on the 
television screen is as much a unit of intentional selection and misinformation as it is 
one of ubiquitous and instantaneous information. Thus, the pixel appears to break 
with the indexicality of analogue film demonstrating every image can be manipulated. 
Yet, this break is also retrospectively engineered to unravel the analogue index.  
When a section of an image is enlarged, we become aware of the pixels 
making up this image not as what Virilio (1991) has called “continuous field” but, 
rather, as “discontinuous grain” which appears distorted and blurred. Pixelation is a 
common technique used to disguise information or identifying characteristics the 
most common of these including car number plates or a person’s face. Where 
pixelation is generally associated with protecting an individual and their privacy, this 
is not a neutral technique but belongs to an aesthetic of fear aimed at holding the 
viewer at a marked distance from the scenes they are watching. The need to mask or 
distort aspects of an image attest to a need to protect the framed subject. But from 
what or whom exactly? Surely it is the viewer first and foremost who is presented as a 
 threat, as a potential suspect not to be trusted with certain information. Not only does 
the screen frame and limit the information available to us, it also constantly reminds 
us of these frames and limits. 
The pixel, as unit of misinformation, represents, on the one hand, a mistrust of 
the population, of the television audience. Despite the championing of a more 
autonomous, creative and interactive audience in both marketing and academic 
discourse on new social media platforms, it is fair to say that such hyperbole 
continues to be underpinned by a distain for consumers of mass media. Television 
audiences continue to be regarded as passive, zombified morons. Consequently, the 
idea of trust here concerns less a trust that has been lost, since no one has ever had 
faith in television viewers, and more a trust which has not yet been earned. And, as it 
turns out, a trust which can never fully be earned within a neoliberal society based on 
deferral and refusal of responsibility at all levels.4 The pixel tells us that, as viewers, 
we cannot and should not be trusted with certain information. 
On the other hand, the pixel is presented as a form of protection both for those 
on screen and also for those watching. As such it embodies another interrelated form 
of power endemic to Western biopolitics: pastoral power. Taking up Michel 
Foucault’s discussion of pastoral power in his 1978 lecture series Security, Territory, 
Population, Alain Brossat (2015) has more recently identified today’s dominant mode 
of government with an impoverished version of pastoral power as it reduces 
populations to flocks and individuals to lost sheep incapable of decision-making and 
whose health, safety and security is offset against freedom of expression, movement 
and action. Thus, the pixel constitutes a specific visual technique within the ongoing 
negotiations of freedom of information and data protection that reconfigure civil 
liberties and conceal the illegal and extralegal activities of global business and 
 government alike. The pixel indicates that someone has access to the whole picture, 
just not us. Someone has access and has decided to very deliberately conceal it from 
us in plain sight.5 
Situated within a digital aesthetics of truth aimed at inoculating the population 
via a carefully regulated administration of fear, the pixel is intended to produce within 
us a simultaneous anxiety and desire for the truth it masks, a hunger and revulsion for 
information. We have always seen too much and yet, as we are constantly reminded 
of the cuts, edits and censorship at work, this too much is never enough. Thus, when 
we see pixelation at work in a news report or documentary we are supposed to be 
persuaded by its rhetoric. The blurred image which obstructs our visual perception of 
an individual signifies that a different level of truth is at work. The presence of 
pixelation informs us we are accessing a truth, a level authenticity which requires 
mediation as interference. The pixel is at once symbol of truth and gatekeeper to this 
truth.  
 
The Incarcerated Informant 
Focusing my discussion on the specific framings of criminality, I want to draw 
attention to a particular and increasingly commonplace instance of the pixel as unit of 
misinformation. This is a common technique used to depict the incarcerated 
informant. The criminal “informant” has become a regular figure and feature on prime 
time television now dominated by various prison documentary franchises such as 
MSNBC’s LockUp series and its spin-offs. If widespread, accepted uses of pixelation 
attest to a bad faith exercise which claims respect and privacy whilst asserting an 
infantilizing politics of mistrust and fear, the pixelated face of the prison informant, 
 seeking protection from those on both the inside and outside, enables us to see more 
clearly the deliberately alienating and dehumanizing effects of pixelation. 
Take for example, the use of pixelation upon Gangster X in the documentary 
Gangs Behind Bars filmed inside Sacramento jail in California. Gangster X is an 
inmate who had agreed to discuss protective custody following an incident in which 
his mistake led to the seizure of gang information.6 Pixelated images of gangster X 
are used alongside those of his silhouette in which his profile can very clearly be 
distinguished. Rather than film the inmate from one position, of the back of his head, 
for example, shots are also taken of him walking as well as close ups of his cuffed 
hands and wrists. While his face and tattoos are pixelated, these shots make 
identifying Gangster X straightforward. Here, pixelation occurs not to protect the 
criminal but to render him inhuman whilst retaining other identifying marks. 
Thus, the pixel - as embodiment of the age of digital representation - needs to 
be thought alongside other theories by which both the criminal and docile body are 
marked, marked up, marked out. As such, the pixel constitutes what Michel Foucault 
(1977) has referred to as a micro-technology of power operating on and through the 
body. Like the branding of a criminal or a prison tattoo, the pixel visibly inscribes the 
transgressive body. Yet, this is a visibility defined by its unreadability. Pixelation 
carves up the flesh yet not necessarily into identifiable, manageable pieces. Pixelation 
often resembles a blurred “floating” mask which hovers over an individual’s actual 
face. Here, it takes on a spectral or ghostly form which we might think of as the 
ghastly, apotheosis of Franz Fanon’s (1986) white mask, a mask worn to ensure 
survival but a survival that comes at the cost of the violent loss of identity.  
Like the assimilated subject of colonial gaze in Fanon, if the mask constitutes 
a way to “pass” unnoticed yet in wearing a mask, there is always a risk that one’s 
 performance fails to measure up and that instead of “passing” unnoticed, one becomes 
a ridiculous parody. The pixel mask is fully visible as mask - a public statement of 
one’s invisibility, one’s cooperation with or containment by law enforcement and 
securitization techniques. It does not operate to hide a threat but instead functions 
very precisely in constituting the threat beneath, the existence of a dangerous identity 
which might escape out at any moment from behind the mask. The pixel mask 
produces a doubling of the screen itself which reminds us once more of the proximity 
of the other, of the threat of the other, we have invited into our homes, into our living 
room. Yet, at the same time, we are forced to recognize just how quickly, how easily 
we, too, can become both source and target of that threat, we too can be required to 
give up our identity to ensure our safety, security and privacy. 
 
A Digital Aesthetics of Truth 
As operant of fear, the pixel is essentially paradoxical – it simultaneously identifies 
those who are guilty, those who are ashamed and those who are afraid and, in doing 
so, renders these unidentifiable, reduced to faceless, pixelated flesh. It is a process 
which captures the docile body along with the criminal body and subjects this body to 
the same processes of normalization and, moreover, securitization. Yet, despite the 
increased development of lossless compression techniques, an image that has been 
pixelated and flattened cannot be rerendered without recourse to an original image. 
Likewise, the saturated, pixelated image from a CCTV camera or poor resolution .gif 
cannot be given detail and definition not originally captured. The possibilities for 
rerendering the poor quality, pixelated image are nevertheless mythologized in 
science fiction (Bladerunner) and crime drama (Crime Scene Investigation) as key to 
identifying a criminal. The apotheosis of this mythologizing takes the form not simply 
 of an enhanced surveillance image but of the enhancement of a reflection on a murder 
victim’s retina prior to their attack. 
This mythologizing is not simply cheap artistic license for viewers who are all 
too aware that it’s lazy scriptwriting yet who are either too tired to call bullshit or too 
easily seduced by a digital aesthetics of truth which has been substituted for narrative. 
It is important to think about what is at stake in the persistence of the myth of the 
rerendered pixelated image along with the comparable infallibility not to mention 
speed of other forensic technologies such as DNA evidence as depicted on fictional 
crime shows like Crime Scene Investigation. Such shows attest to what Virilio (1994) 
terms “the hyperrealism of legal and police representation.” Moreover, it is the 
fictional reimagining of forensic science, video compression technologies and global 
database networks that is itself impacting real court cases in far more complex and 
nuanced ways than simply what has been dubbed the ‘CSI Effect’ - the overreliance 
of juries on forensic data and, in particular, speculative DNA results. To assume 
members of a jury are incapable of distinguishing between fictional representations of 
evidence and the information being presented to them in a courtroom is, as various 
legal scholars have argued, to take a highly reductive view of the role of crime drama 
on public perception. However, the high level of debate here should only emphasize 
further the extent of the impact of crime drama upon public, intellectual and 
institutional consciousness alike. One also needs to take into account the way 
prosecutors are increasingly drawing on forensic results in order to “frame” their 
evidence according to this digital aesthetics of truth and the demand this is creating 
for larger forensic departments along with the explosion of forensic science degree 
programs on offer in the U.S. 
 Nevertheless, increased public interest in such technologies cannot but 
sideline other, more archaic forms of truth-gathering most notably those that provide 
verbal rather than visual testimony. This is the consequence of the break with 
indexicality produced with the advent of the digital image and forms part of what 
Virilio terms “the crisis in perceptive faith” (1994) which sees human perception 
supplanted by the “rational illusions” offered to us by “statistical images”. The 
eyewitness account risks becoming extraneous, since unlike scientific data, the 
eyewitness can be convinced that he or she is mistaken, can change or withdraw 
testimony under duress. Thus the eyewitness, as depicted on television, undergoes a 
double displacement – rendered pixel, he or she, becomes empty, invisible signifier of 
truth. At the same time, this truth-value remains two dimensional, indebted to the 
pixel for validation while the content of their statement becomes subordinated to the 
micro-perceptions and representations of a digital forensics. 
A key observation running throughout Virilio’s work concerns our unquestioning 
belief in ever-smaller units of measurement resulting in the deferral of perception and 
experience. We no longer experience the smallest and indeed largest units of time, 
space, sound and light empirically but must refer to complex technological prostheses 
and their methods of representing such information to us in images, signs and 
language we believe we can understand and interpret. Yet, what is it that we are 
reading, understanding, interpreting? As Virilio suggests: 
 
The imbalance between the direct information of our senses and the mediated information of 
the advanced technologies is so great that we have ended up transferring our value judgments 
and our measure of things from the object to its figure, from the form to its image, from 
reading episodes of our history to noting their statistical tendencies. As part of this grand 
transferal, we now face the major technological danger of a generalized delirium of 
interpretation. (Virilio1991). 
 
 Even when a pixelated image or the set of squares and lines composing a biometric 
image can be referred back to an original image, a recognizable human face with all 
the complex ethical obligations its look, gaze, appeal evokes in us  – this referral 
relies upon a complex set of technologies to carry out this reading, a reading which 
not only identifies a face but defines the parameters of our encounter and engagement 
with this face. Framed by pixels, biometrics and now algorithmic surveillance which 
identifies an individual by mapping physical movements – the events of our lives, our 
human histories are reduced to lines on a form, cells in a database, points on a graph. 
At the end of Vision Machine, Virilio suggests that the importance of statistical 
science based on the calculation and analysis of the pixel lies not simply in its art of 
persuasion but also its “discrimination capacities”. Here, we should understand 
“discrimination” as never simply referring to a scientific, objective, apolitical 
selection and analysis of data. 
Alongside our discussion of the pixel, it is also important to note how 
contemporary images of incarceration attest to a blind spot in much recent scholarship 
taken up with the image of the subversive “other.” Butler (2010) is able to draw links 
between the veiled Muslim woman, the “suspected” terrorist held indefinitely in 
Guantanamo and the figure of the Western queer precisely because she presumes 
innocence or, at the very least, the “right to the presumption of innocence” in each 
case. All three are easily constructed as “victims” in Butler’s narrative as a result of 
their parallel construction in the narratives of rightwing US media as “threatening” or 
“subversive” to American values. To produce a more sustained analysis of the way in 
which fear is mediated via images of “otherness” requires supplementing Butler’s 
discussion with one which takes into consideration the presence as much as the 
absence of the “dangerous acts” she refers to.7 A critique of the institutional spaces 
 which both house and produce criminal subjects and the framing techniques in 
operation within and beyond such spaces needs to be able to think about how these 
techniques also apply to those responsible for perpetuating a very real violence upon 
others. In other words, we need to think further about the framing (in its multiple 
senses) of rapists and murderers and not just the perceived violence of the potential 
terror suspects taken up by Butler or the petty drug dealers who constitute the primary 
focus of Michelle Alexander’s (2012) study of mass incarceration in the US as the 
new “Jim Crow.” 
Thus, our consideration of the “pixel” must be situated within a broader 
analysis of visual representations of criminality and incarceration and the multiple 
techniques used to frame and diffuse such images. What is at stake in our 
consumption of these images of exclusion? How are those excluded encouraged and 
even required to “perform” their exclusion? What possibilities are there for what 
Michael Welch (2011) has called “reversing the optics”, for tactics of 
counterveillance, alternative forms of representation and self-representation? And to 
what extent have such possibilities already been recuperated by mainstream tabloid 
media and intellectual left alike - all of whom are to some extent complicit in turning 
the prison into a themepark and those incarcerated into sideshows? The pixel is key to 
such debates not least in its role alongside other techniques of marking and defining 
the criminal and docile body.  
 
Conclusion 
While keeping sight of the pixel and its function, how might we begin to engage with 
some of the questions raised above concerning the forms of self-representation and 
their recuperation within and beyond the carceral space? In 2013, one of the featured 
 artworks in the Koestler Trust’s “Strength and Vulnerability Bunker” exhibition at the 
Royal Festival Hall was an image on canvas entitled “Sorrow” by an artist, Andrew, 
based in HM Prison Blantyre House, Kent. The figure of a man bent in prayer, 
composed of hundreds of tiny grayscale squares on a green background, inspired a 
series of questions about self-representation, incarceration and the pixel. This is not so 
much a question of reversing the optics or re-rendering the image. Techniques of 
compression are never without loss of some kind. Instead, the work involves the 
reframing of the pixel and, more specifically, reframing the criminal or detainee. 
Thus, do we read this image as some form of acquiescence, the offender identifying 
and reproducing his own identity as offender? And, in doing so, is there also an 
acknowledgment on our part and that of the artist of a digital aesthetics – the pixel as 
referent of truth in its measurement and capture of threat and fear? Or, can we read 
something else at work here in the transferal of the pixel onto canvas, its 
transformation from digital to analogue, immaterial to material, fluid to static?  
While it is necessary to exercise a certain amount of cynicism in relation to 
organizations such as the Koestler Trust and the role of its “Offender Art” in 
producing complicity amongst both public and prisoners with today’s prison system, I 
also wonder whether cynicism and pessimism are too easy here. Virilio’s pessimism 
in the face of the administration of fear and its reliance upon a digital aesthetics of 
truth is surely one that demands militancy rather than despondency. Might we also 
learn from Deleuze’s reading of Bacon here? Returning to the passage which opened 
our discussion, how might the uncomfortable call to respond to Bacon’s screaming 
meat alert us to a different ethical obligation, one that also arises in our encounter 
with the pixelated flesh of the criminal, incarcerated body?  
 
 Notes 
 
1 In 2008, a series of filmed images produced by inmates in Europe’s largest prison, Fleury-Mérogis, 
using smuggled mobile phones caused outrage and scandal after they were released online. Similarly, 
in November 2013, an enquiry was launched after two mobile phone films of inmates doing a “Harlem 
Shake” in a corridor inside Montmédy prison, also in France, were uploaded to YouTube. 
2 This claim is echoed by W.J.T. Mitchell (2010) when he claims that “Every history is really two 
histories. The history of what happened and the history of the perception of what happened.” 
3 If we also take into consideration the multiple accounts circulating as to how the CIA initially brought 
crack cocaine into black communities and today continue to oversee drug trafficking into the U.S., the 
twofold process of “captivating” both potential crack users and the U.S. public at large prior to the 
mass ‘capture’ of users and dealers becomes further apparent. 
4 Here my reading of neoliberalism in terms of a deferral of responsibility is indebted to Giorgio 
Agamben’s “economic theology” itself a clarification and critique of Carl Schmitt’s “political 
theology.” For Agamben (2011), modern forms of Western government are not based on the notion of 
a “lost” sovereign authority but, rather, rely on a perpetual deferral of ultimate authority and therefore 
responsibility. 
5 Of course, the irony here is that no one, not even Google, has access to the whole picture. 
6 Gangster X committed the unforgiveable mistake of carrying “kites” - tiny rolls of paper filled with 
microscopic coded information about a gang – on his person rather than concealing these internally. 
Kites often contain a gang’s strategies and planned hits and therefore are highly coveted by prison 
authorities. Such information may be put to use by penal officers in various ways, but the documentary 
implies the value of kites as a currency used by guards to exacerbate internal tensions within a gang 
more than to prevent intra-gang warfare. 
7 This is something I have discussed at length elsewhere (Fuggle 2013) 
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